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Empiricism and the Misdemeanor Courts: Promoting 
Wider, Deeper, and Interdisciplinary Study 
 
Alisa Smith* 
 
Abstract 
 
Since 1956, there have been three waves of scholarly 
attention on the misdemeanor courts. Despite this attention, 
misdemeanor courts remain understudied and overlooked. The 
object of this paper is to summarize the empirical research 
conducted over the last sixty years and identify the scholarly work 
that should be undertaken on the processing of misdemeanor 
offenders in our courts. Buoyed by the current interest in studying 
the misdemeanor courts, scholars should widen and deepen their 
study by replicating the work of others in a variety of 
jurisdictions, observing court proceedings, interviewing 
defendants and the courtroom workgroup, and assessing whether 
constitutional ideals are being upheld by our misdemeanor 
courts. 
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Introduction 
 
Legal and empirical scholars have largely ignored the study 
of misdemeanor offending, yet, each year, millions of people are 
arrested and prosecuted for misdemeanor crimes.1  The research 
area is deserving of systemic empirical study.2  Almost 80% of 
state court criminal caseloads—an estimated ten million cases 
filed annually in the United States—are comprised of 
misdemeanor prosecutions.3  Though penalties for misdemeanor 
crimes are less severe than felony crimes, they are far from 
inconsequential.4  Misdemeanants are prosecuted for criminal 
offenses, not only civil traffic crimes.  These crimes are 
punishable by up to one year in jail and some crimes, like petit 
theft and driving under the influence, may be prosecuted as 
felonies for a third offense.  Convictions carry significant and 
long-term collateral consequences, including the loss of driving 
privileges, removal from public housing, reduced educational 
and employment opportunities, revoked professional licenses, 
and potential deportations.5 
There is a growing body of literature that has recognized the 
 
1.  Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 
(2012). 
2.  See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx 
?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808.  
3.  ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M. 
STRICKLAND & KATHRYN A. HOLT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012), http://www.court 
statistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx. 
4.  See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1089 (2013). 
5.  Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1316–17. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/8
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need for study in misdemeanor courts.  Research has 
demonstrated that misdemeanor cases are processed quickly 
and with little attention to due process.6  No research has 
focused on whether misdemeanor defendants understand their 
right to due process of law, their reasons for waiving counsel or 
entering guilty pleas, and the short- and long-term consequences 
of forfeiting their rights.7  Research on felony offenders and some 
defendants charged with gross misdemeanors has illustrated 
that defendants’ comprehension of the plea colloquy is generally 
poor.8 
Systematic, observational field research is necessary to (1) 
uncover “what actually happens in America’s courtrooms day-to-
day;”9 (2) understand the factors that influence misdemeanant 
decisions to enter a plea or assert their right to trial; (3) 
investigate whether misdemeanants enter pleas and waive 
counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and (4) 
examine the influence of due process and the courtroom 
workgroup (or lack thereof) on defendants’ perceptions and 
procedural justice. 
 
I. The Supreme Court and Misdemeanant’s 
Constitutional Rights 
 
Although the Fifth Amendment guarantees due process and 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel and jury trials in 
criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court’s early decisional law 
carved out exceptions in the prosecution of misdemeanor 
offenders.10  These petty offenses were disposed by summary 
proceedings before a magistrate and, in the early years, a police 
 
6.  ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN , THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND 
WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9–10, 15 (2011); BORUCHOWITZ  ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 11. 
7.  Allison D. Redlich, Vanessa A. Edkins, Stephanos Bibas & Stephanie 
Madon, The Psychology of Defendant Plea Decision Making, 72 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 339, 347–50 (2017); Allison D. Redlich & Alicia Summers, 
Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Pleas: Understanding the Plea Inquiry, 18 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 626, 632 (2012).  
8.  Redllich & Summers, supra note 7, at 6–7.  
9.  Redlich et al., supra note 7, at 350.  
10.  Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888). 
3
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magistrate.11  To distinguish between petty and trivial offenses 
and those more serious and deserving of constitutional 
protection, the Supreme Court evaluated the nature and 
immorality of the offenses, whether the offenses were indictable 
at common law, and the severity of the potential punishments.12  
Determining whether punishments were considered severe 
posed a challenge, but the Court steadfastly held for thirty more 
years that a jail term was not necessarily “so serious” that a jury 
trial or counsel was constitutionally necessary.13  Even when 
acknowledging that standards could change, the Supreme Court 
in Clawans, citing to municipal ordinances, statutory offenses,14 
and Acts of Parliament,15 held that, by 1937, standards had not 
 
11.  Id. at 554; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140–41 (1894). 
12.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937). 
13.  Id. at 625 (citing Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904)). 
14.  Id. at 628 n.6 (“(A) Statutes embracing violations of municipal 
ordinances generally.  E.g.: Ariz. Rev. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928) §§ 382, 442, 
(three months); Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) §§ 18-201, 18-205 (three months); New 
Mex. Stat. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 90-402 (66), 90-901, 90-910, 79-322, (three 
months); Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 1128 (1), 1167, (six months); Wyo. 
Rev. Stat. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 22-402, 22-409, (three months).  (B) Statutes 
commanding summary trial for specified offenses.  E.g.: N. J. Comp. Laws 
(1924 Supp.), §§ 135-63 (3), 135-76 (operating motor vehicle under influence of 
liquor; six months; see Klinges v. Court of Common Pleas, 130 Atl. 601); N. J. 
Comp. Laws (1930 Supp.) § 160-222, 3 (disorderly persons act; three months 
penalty, see N. J. Laws 1898, p. 954, increased to one year by laws 1910, p. 37); 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931), § 18-2033 (vagrancy; six months); § 18-2832 
(frequenting of public places by thieves, for unlawful purpose; three months).  
The most extensive elimination of the jury prevails in New York.  The three-
judge Court of Special Sessions, sitting without a jury, has jurisdiction to try 
all misdemeanors [i.e., offenses punishable with one year’s imprisonment, N. 
Y. Penal Law (1909), § 1937] committed in New York City.  Inferior Criminal 
Courts Act of the City of New York, N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 659, § 31 (1), (4).  A 
city magistrate sitting alone may try certain misdemeanors, including 
violations of N. Y. Penal Law (1909) § 1566, proscribing the sale of street 
railroad transfer tickets, Inferior Criminal Courts Act, § 43 (d), added by Laws 
1915, c. 531.  Other legislation, state-wide in application, provides for 
summary trial and conviction of persons guilty of disorderly conduct (six 
months), N. Y. Penal Law (1923), §§ 723, 724; of persons frequenting a public 
place for purposes of crime (100 days), N. Y. Code Crim. Proc., § 898-a; of 
‘vagrants’ (one year in jail; three years in correctional institution), N. Y. Code 
Crim. Proc., §§ 891, 891-a.”). 
15.  Id. at n.8 (“Thirty-seven offenses are listed in Stone’s Justices’ 
Manual (66th ed. 1934), Appendix of Table of Punishments for Offences 
Cognizable Under the Summary Jurisdiction, pp. 1904-1945.  E.g., Frauds by 
Workmen Act, 1777, 17 Geo. III, c. 56, § 1; Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, 50 & 
51 Vict., c. 28, § 2; Agricultural Marketing Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. V, c. 31, § 6 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/8
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changed enough to necessitate jury trials for six-month 
sentences. 
It was not until the late 1960s, following a scathing report 
by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, that the Court began holding 
misdemeanor defendants were entitled to some constitutional 
protections.  The President’s Commission found “inequity, 
indignity[,] and ineffectiveness” in the lower courts and 
concluded that these courts were in crisis.16  In a series of cases 
involving the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the 
Court extended to the states several rights to misdemeanor 
defendants in criminal prosecutions, including the right to a 
speedy trial,17 the right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses,18 and the right to call and compel witnesses in their 
defense.19 
The Court extended the right to a jury trial to defendants 
facing two years in prison, holding “that a crime punishable by 
two years in prison is, based on past and contemporary 
standards in this country, a serious crime and not a petty 
offense.”20  However, it did not decide whether punishments 
between six months and two years of incarceration amounted to 
petty offenses with trivial punishments, or grave offenses that 
were serious enough to warrant a jury trial.21  In its 1970 
decision, Baldwin v. New York, the Court drew that line at six 
 
(5).  Several of the statutes specify larger penalties, but by § 17 of the Summary 
Judicature Act, 1879, 42-43 Vict., c. 49, except in cases of assault, sentences 
exceeding three months cannot be administered unless the accused has been 
offered the choice of trial by jury.”). 
16.  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE 
REPORT: THE COURTS 29 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1967), https://www.ncjrs 
.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/176NCJRS.pdf. 
17.  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). 
18.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
19.  Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
20.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (footnote omitted); see 
also District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 617 (1937); Schick v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 65, 65 (1904); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan 
v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888); see generally Felix Frankfurter & Thomas 
G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial 
by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No 
Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959). 
21.  Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149–51 (1969); see also Bloom 
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). 
5
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months after distinguishing between petty and serious offenses 
and holding “no offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the 
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six 
months is authorized.”22 
Decisional law on the importance of counsel was viewed 
differently.  The Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin extended the 
right to counsel to misdemeanor defendants who faced the 
potential of serving jail, no matter how short the term.23  Thirty 
years later, in Alabama v. Shelton, the Court reaffirmed its 
holding and emphasized that “a suspended sentence that may 
‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not 
be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the guiding hand 
of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged.”24  As such, 
Shelton requires the trial judge appoint counsel when there is a 
potential for jail in misdemeanor cases, including suspended or 
probated sentences.25 
Most states have a constitutional or statutory requirement 
that afford defendants—including misdemeanants—appeals as 
a matter of right in criminal cases.26  However, the Supreme 
Court has refused to recognize the right to appeal as a matter of 
due process.27  In refusing to extend due process to appeals, the 
Court, relying on nineteenth century dicta, interpreted the right 
as a “matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice.”28  
Despite not recognizing the right to appeal as fundamental, in 
Griffin v. Illinois29 the Court held that where a state 
constitution, federal statute, or state law provides for an appeal 
as a matter of right, the Equal Protection Clause is violated 
when appellate remedies are withheld from indigent criminal 
 
22.  399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
23.  407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). 
24.  535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40). 
25.  Id. at 672–74. 
26.  Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
1219, 1222 (2013) (citing Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right 
to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 513–14 (1992)). 
27.  District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937) (citing 
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894)). 
28.  Robertson, supra note 26, at 1221 n.6 (quoting Cobbledick v. United 
States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940)).  
29.  351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/8
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defendants.30  Likewise, in Douglas v. California, the Court held 
that if, by legislative choice, states afford defendants the right 
to counsel on appeal, then counsel must provide effective 
assistance to those defendants.31  However, in Ross v. Moffitt, 
the Court did not extend the right to counsel to indigents at 
second-level criminal appeals.32 
 
II. Empirical Research on Misdemeanors 
 
A. The First Wave of Empiricism of the Misdemeanor Courts  
 
1. Early Research on the Lower Courts 
 
Predating the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
Report, which described the courts as inequitable and 
inefficient, Professor Caleb Foote observed that court 
proceedings focused on the prosecution of minor crimes (i.e., 
vagrancy) with bail policies that disadvantaged the poor.  He 
identified significant relationships between release and 
acquittal,33 and his early work “describe[d] and critique[d] ‘law 
in action.’”34  Caleb Foote observed the Police Magistrate Court 
in Philadelphia, where he saw “undesirables” regularly arrested, 
quick proceedings with little due process, and inequitable and 
questionable sentences meted out by lay justices, with few cases 
reviewed by higher courts.35  He noted a variety of themed 
abuses rooted in procedural unfairness, and his 1956 article 
recommended that misdemeanors be heard in courts with 
legally-trained  judges  and greater due process.36   As evidenced 
by the 1967 report by the President’s Commission, little has 
 
30.  Id. at 18; see also Robertson, supra note 26, at 1246. 
31.  372 U.S. 353, 355–56 (1963). 
32.  417 U.S. 600, 602–603, 605 (1974). 
33.  See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. 
PA. L. REV. 603 (1956) [hereinafter Vagrancy-Type Law]; Caleb Foote, 
Comments on Preventive Detention, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 48 (1970) [hereinafter 
Comments on Preventive Detention]. 
34.  Jerome Skolnick, Reflections on Caleb Foote on Vagrancy-Type Laws, 
12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 151, 153 (2008) (citing Michael Steven Green, Legal 
Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005)). 
35.  Vagrancy-Type Law, supra note 33, at 604. 
36.  Id. 
7
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changed in the processing of cases in the misdemeanor courts. 
An early comprehensive study of the lower courts by Susan 
S. Silbey compiled descriptions of the lower courts, summarized 
their history, and (again) criticized the lack of due process.37  In 
her survey, Silbey highlighted the breadth and uniqueness of 
these wide-reaching courts.  In some jurisdictions, the judges 
were lawyers and in others, they were not; some judges were 
considered part-time and others full-time.38  The types of cases 
that were heard in these courts varied from state-to-state.  Jury 
trials were only available in 79% of the courts.39  Caseload, 
appeals from decisions, and the types of proceedings heard in 
these courts varied.  Despite these facts, the lower courts often 
conduct “more than ninety percent of the trial work of the states’ 
court systems,”40 the “data which [they were] able to collect and 
tabulate raise[d] more questions than [were] answered.”41 
The first systematic study of misdemeanor case processing 
was conducted by Malcolm Feeley.42  In his seminal work, The 
Process is the Punishment, Feeley conducted a comprehensive 
review of misdemeanor cases in the Court of Common Pleas in 
New Haven, Connecticut and found that it was the pretrial 
arrest, detention, and court proceedings that was the true 
punishment, not the adjudication or sentence.43  Feeley’s work 
explored disparities in misdemeanor sentencing and 
dispositions, and he found that most cases were resolved by 
prosecutorial dismissal or guilty plea. 
Few legal or extralegal factors showed strong influence in 
either determining dismissal, plea, or sentencing.  The most 
influential factor was that multiple charges resulted in a greater 
chance that prosecutors dismissed one or more of them in 
exchange for defendants’ guilty pleas.  With few other significant 
findings, Feeley jettisoned a quantitative approach in 
understanding the courts for a qualitative one, involving direct 
 
37.  See SUSAN S. SILBEY, WHAT THE LOWER COURTS DO: THE WORK AND 
ROLE OF COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1979). 
38.  Id. at tbls.13 & 16. 
39.  Id. at tbl.22. 
40.  Id. at IV.1. 
41.  Id. at II.44. 
42.  MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (Russell Sage Found. 1979). 
43.  Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/8
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observation.44  In his comprehensive work, Feeley explored the 
convoluted path of misdemeanor cases from arrest through 
disposition, interweaving the stages of the court proceedings 
from pretrial decisions through outcomes.  Feeley’s work 
highlighted the importance of courtroom workgroup 
relationships, plea bargaining, and the swiftness of case 
processing.  He concluded that it was not the punishment, which 
was relatively minor, but the process that was harsh.  He 
cautioned that efforts to increase due process might slow the 
proceedings, resulting in increased jail terms for the poor, who 
could not bond out of jail, or multiple court appearances, 
resulting in missed work for those least able to afford it.45 
In 1981, James J. Alfini edited and published the findings 
from a joint project of the American Judicature Society and the 
Institute for Court Management, titled Misdemeanor Courts: 
Policy Concerns and Research Perspectives, which 
comprehensively summarized the research on the misdemeanor 
courts.46  The report summarized the literature to date at that 
time and concluded that there was a demonstrated need for 
empirical, systematic, and widespread research.47  At the time, 
Malcolm Feeley’s study was “the first major study of an urban 
misdemeanor court by a social scientist,”48 and it was “the most 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the lower court 
process to date, [but Alfini cautioned] there [was] a risk of 
overgeneralizing the findings of this case study.”49  Alfini was 
particularly concerned that Feeley’s conclusions “that officials 
are generally concerned with ‘substantive justice’ and that 
procedural reform efforts in courts like New Haven’s may 
adversely affect this desire to do substantive justice” were 
overbroad, and failed to account for or appreciate “the diversity  
in adjudication and sentencing practices among state 
misdemeanor courts.”50 
 
44.  Id. at 149. 
45.  Id. at 241, 290. 
46.  MISDEMEANOR COURTS: POLICY CONCERNS AND RESEARCH 
PERSPECTIVES (James J. Alfini ed. 1981) [hereinafter Misdemeanor Courts]. 
47.  See generally id. 
48.  Id. at 11. 
49.  Id.  
50.  Id. at 11–12 (Malcolm Feeley’s recommendations contradicted the 
early views of Caleb Foote, who documented courts run amok without 
9
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2. The Outcome Is the Punishment: Post-Feeley 
Empirical Studies 
 
In 1980, following Feeley’s seminal work, Ryan examined 
2,764 cases in a single municipal court in Columbus, Ohio, and, 
contrary to Feeley’s conclusion, he found “the outcome [was] the 
punishment.”51  Ryan attributed the different findings to 
distinctions between Columbus and New Haven in political, 
cultural, and court characteristics and structures.52  He found 
that the New Haven court was less punitive53 and the two 
jurisdictions differed on the impact of counsel.  Where 
“unrepresented defendants fare[d] significantly less well” in 
New Haven, the type of counsel—self-representation, public 
defenders, or private counsel—had very little influence on 
outcomes in Columbus.54  Ryan suggested the disparity might be 
understood due to the actual number of unrepresented 
defendants.  In New Haven, there were quite a few 
unrepresented defendants and, following Argersinger v. Hamlin 
(1972), defendants could not be imprisoned unless provided with 
counsel.55  In Columbus, most defendants were represented and, 
if they weren’t, they were encouraged by judges to speak with 
public defenders before resolving their cases, making the 
incarceration of misdemeanor defendants constitutional.56  Ryan 
also  found that:  sanctions were  more  severe in  Columbus, the  
courtroom workgroup perceived case outcomes as significant, 
there was a penalty for going to trial, and recidivists and 
defendants with more serious charges were more harshly 
punished.57 
In another chapter of Misdemeanor Courts, James Alfini 
and Patricia Passuth explore two important research questions 
on  “the impact of the defense attorney on (1) case outcomes and 
 
procedural fairness). 
51.  John Paul Ryan, Adjudication and Sentencing in a Misdemeanor 
Court: The Outcome Is the Punishment, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 79, 100 (1980). 
52.  Id. at 79. 
53.  Id. at 81. 
54.  Id. at 93. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 93–94. 
57.  Ryan, supra note 51, at 94, 96. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/8
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(2) case processing practices in the misdemeanor courts.”58  At 
that time, research suggested that represented defendants fared 
better in misdemeanor courts than the unrepresented.59  Both 
Katz  and Feeley found that represented defendants got lighter 
sentences in the former and were slightly more likely to get a 
dismissal and favorable sentence in the latter.60  In examining 
the relationship between defense attorney and case processing 
in misdemeanor courts, Alfini and Passuth surveyed 
approximately 700 misdemeanor judges in urban, suburban, and 
rural communities on their perceptions of the presence of 
defense counsel on outcomes and processing.61  They found little 
effect of the frequency of defense attorneys on judges’ 
perceptions of caseload pressures or ability to maintain current 
workloads.62  Additionally, in jurisdictions where defense 
attorneys were more frequently present, case processing was 
more “stretched-out,” meaning a lower percentage of cases 
[were] disposed at initial appearance and . . . tend[ed] to go 
through more stages in courts where defense counsel [were] 
more frequently present.”63 
 
B. The Second-Wave of Empiricism of the Misdemeanor 
Courts 
 
For nearly ten years, empirical research on the 
misdemeanor courts lay dormant.  In 1993, Jamieson and 
Blowers undertook a quantitative, rather than Feeley-like, 
observational and qualitative study of the misdemeanor court in 
a single county, particularly focused on dispositional court 
outcomes as influenced by victim types and representation by 
counsel.64  Jamieson and Blowers randomly selected 1,670 non-
 
58.  Misdemeanor Courts, supra note 46, at 137. 
59.  Id. at 138–39 (citing Lewis R. Katz, Municipal Courts – Another 
Urban Ill, 20 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 87 (1968)); see also FEELEY, supra 
note 42. 
60.  See FEELEY, supra note 42; Katz, supra note 59. 
61.  FEELEY, supra note 42, at 140. 
62.  Id. at 155. 
63.  Id. 
64.  See generally Katherine M. Jamieson & Anita Neuberger Blowers, A 
Structural Examination of Misdemeanor Court Disposition Patterns, 31 
CRIMINOLOGY 243 (1993). 
11
ARTICLE 8_SMITH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2019  2:14 PM 
464 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
traffic misdemeanor cases prosecuted by the District Attorney’s 
office in Mecklenburg County (Charlotte), North Carolina.65  
They found that individual victims’ cases were more likely to 
result in dismissal or acquittal than corporate or victimless 
crimes, except when defendants were male.  Males were more 
likely to be convicted in individual victim cases and their cases 
dismissed in victimless crime cases.  Unexpectedly, the 
seriousness of the offenses and race were not associated with 
case outcomes.  Consistent with the early work of Katz and 
Feeley, Jamieson and Blowers found that defendants with 
counsel were less likely to be convicted in cases with an 
individual victim or victimless crime.66  However, contrary to 
those early studies, defendants represented by public counsel in 
cases involving corporate victims were more likely to be 
convicted than those who self-represented.67 
One of the largest studies on the misdemeanor courts, which 
did not rely on observational data, but official records, was 
conducted by Nelson who examined data on 105,000 persons 
arrested for and convicted of misdemeanor crimes in New York.68  
Nelson focused on the influence of race and ethnicity and found 
racial disparities in misdemeanor sentencing.69  In a study of 
105,000 misdemeanor cases in New York, Nelson found that 
black and Hispanic defendants with a history of prior arrests 
were punished more harshly than white defendants and non-
white defendants without prior records were punished less 
harshly.70  Additionally, he found that non-white defendants 
with prior records were far more often sentenced to jail than 
similarly-situated white defendants and white defendants were 
more likely to be fined.71  Nelson concluded that the disparities 
in sentencing contributed to the “concentration of minorities in 
New York State’s jails.”72 
Nearly ten years later, Leiber and Blowers examined the 
 
65.  Id. at 248. 
66.  Id. at 246–47. 
67.  Id. at 245. 
68.  James F. Nelson, A Dollar or a Day: Sentencing Misdemeanants in 
New York State, 31 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ 183 (1994). 
69.  See generally id. 
70.  Id. at 198. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
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influence of legal and extralegal factors on misdemeanor 
sentencing.73  Leiber and Blowers focused on the interactive 
effect of offense seriousness and race in examining 1,757 
weighted misdemeanor cases, excluding traffic offenses, 
prosecuted in a single, large, and predominantly urban county.74  
As expected, legal factors predicted whether a case was 
considered a priority, i.e., cases that prosecutors perceived as 
serious and needing highlighted attention.75  There were some 
race differences in prosecutors’ decisions to mark a case as a 
priority.  In particular, crimes against strangers were more 
likely to be designated for non-priority status for White 
defendants, but the opposite for Black defendants.76  Cases 
involving black defendants were also given greater priority 
when they involved more serious crimes or the defendants had a 
prior record than white defendants.77  Interestingly, however, 
race was not found to have “direct effect” on the decision to 
convict or incarcerate.78  Leiber and Blowers found race had 
indirect effects through the procedural variables of priority 
status and whether a continuance was granted.79  By prioritizing 
cases and refusing continuances, the chances of conviction and 
incarceration increased.80 
Because black defendants had a greater chance of having 
their cases classified as a priority or be denied a continuance, 
they had a greater chance of being convicted or incarcerated.81  
This research concluded that it was essential to measure the 
indirect effect of race on legal decision-making, rather than 
wrongly concluding that race had no effect because it was not 
direct.82  Particularly, Leiber and Blowers’ work suggested that 
prosecutors perpetuate the racial stereotype of black males 
being dangerous when they classify their cases as a priority or 
 
73.  See Michael J. Leiber & Anita N. Blowers, Race and Misdemeanor 
Sentencing, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 464 (2003). 
74.  Id. at 471.  
75.  Id. at 472.  
76.  Id. at 477.  
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Leiber & Blowers, supra note 73, at 477. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 477–78. 
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serious.83  They proposed research to directly examine this claim 
to distill whether the case or organizational concerns, attitudes, 
or community influences the outcomes.84  As with other research, 
Leiber and Blowers recognized the limitation of study findings 
from a single jurisdiction. 
Muñoz et al. examined cases from three non-metropolitan 
counties.  Muñoz et al. examined the “additive and interactive 
effects of extralegal variables on the enforcement and 
punishment of misdemeanor criminal codes in three non-
metropolitan Nebraska counties with relatively large and 
growing Latino populations.”85  At the time of their study, there 
was unprecedented growth in the Latino population in Nebraska 
and growing complaints of mistreatment by this population, 
particularly in the use of unnecessary traffic stops.86  In 
examining the influence of legal and extralegal factors on 
sentencing, Muñoz et al. found that Latinos/as were more likely 
to be charged with more serious offenses and multiple offenses 
than other defendants.  This resulted in more punitive sanctions 
for Hispanic defendants. 
Their data also suggested that, contrary to their hypothesis, 
“U.S. born Latinos/as may experience the harshest criminal 
justice treatment.”87  Yet, in some of the county data, Muñoz et 
al. found that immigrants experienced more punitive sentencing 
in comparison to non-immigrants.88  While males were more 
likely to receive harsher sentences, this impact was greater for 
Latino males.  However, no significant differences were found 
between the sentences received by white and Latina females.  
Moreover, the seriousness of the offense and the number of 
offenses increased the odds of receiving more serious sentences 
for males committing other misdemeanor offenses (i.e., not 
traffic, assault, resisting, drug/alcohol, or property crimes) and 
women convicted of drug and alcohol offenses. 
 
83.  Id. at 479. 
84.  Id. at 480. 
85.  Ed A. Muñoz, Barbara J. McMorris & Matt J. DeLisi, Misdemeanor 
Criminal Justice: Contextualizing Effects of Latino Ethnicity, Gender, and 
Immigrant Status, 11 RACE, GENDER & CLASS, no. 4, 2004, at 112–13 (footnote 
omitted). 
86.  Id. at 113–14. 
87.  Id. at 124. 
88.  Id. at 124-28. 
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C. The Current Wave of Empiricism of the Misdemeanor 
Courts 
 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding that some 
constitutional rights apply in prosecuting misdemeanor 
offenders and the work of legal scholars and researchers shining 
a light on the inequities and problems that plagued the 
misdemeanor courts, little has changed in the misdemeanor 
courts.  In fact, misdemeanor courts are overwhelmed by cases 
with millions of people prosecuted every year89 and few of those 
constitutionally entitled to counsel and other protections are 
afforded those rights.  On the contrary, current empirical 
research has demonstrated that most proceedings are quick and 
police-dominated, and defendants are usually uncounseled.90  In 
some jurisdictions, little has changed since Caleb Foote observed 
the police magistrate courts in the early 1950s.  In fact, the most 
recent wave or resurgence of empirical research by scholars has 
grown on the heels of increased arrests due to quality-of-life and 
broken windows policing.91  In her account of ordinary injustice, 
Amy Bach documented miscarriages of justice in felony and 
misdemeanor courts from places such as Georgia, New York, 
Mississippi, and Chicago.92  The National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers re-invigorated systematic, 
observational study of the misdemeanor courts by funding 
 
89.  BORUCHOWITZ, ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
90.  See, e.g., David Carroll, Why Our Misdemeanor Courts Are Filled with 
Uncounselled Defendants, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (May 12, 2015), 
http://sixthamendment.org/why-our-misdemeanor-courts-are-filled-with-
uncounselled-defendants/; see also SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 6, at 14; ALISA 
SMITH, SEAN MADDAN, DIANE DEPIETROPAOLO PRICE & COLETTE TVEDT, RUSH TO 
JUDGMENT: HOW SOUTH CAROLINA’S SUMMARY COURTS FAIL TO PROTECT 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers 2017), 
https://www.nacdl.org/RushToJudgement/. 
91. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC, March 1982, at 29-38; see also Bernard E. 
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City 
and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV 271 (2006); K. Babe 
Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2009); Ian 
Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L J. 1157 (2004). 
92.  See generally AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS 
COURT (Metro. Books/Henry Holt & Co. 2010). 
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several research studies, which uncovered significant 
constitutional violations, particularly in the area of the right to 
counsel, and underscored the need for more observational and 
deep research on the misdemeanor courts.93 
Boruchowitz et al. found that misdemeanor courts “are 
incapable of providing accused individuals with the due process 
guaranteed them by the Constitution.”94  Smith and Maddan 
found that most misdemeanor defendants resolved their cases at 
first appearance—on average in three minutes or less and 
without a lawyer—even though they were inadequately advised 
of their constitutional rights and ill-informed about the serious 
consequences that flow from conviction.95  Even more troubling 
was that a study of the magistrate and municipal courts in 
Florida found few courtrooms staffed with attorneys.96  In many 
of the Floridian courtrooms, the judge wasn’t a lawyer, the 
prosecutor was the arresting officer, and the defendants were 
unrepresented by counsel.97  A growing number of not-for-profit 
researchers and legal scholars focusing primarily on the lack of 
counsel note these problems are widespread, creating a “massive 
class of unrepresented defendants” and a “quick-and-dirty 
culture” of entering ill-informed pleas.98 
The Center for Court Innovation conducted a 
comprehensive study of the community court in Brooklyn called 
the Red Hook Community Justice Center and found that court 
legitimacy among court consumers could be improved.99  This 
community court handles misdemeanors, summons for non-
traffic violations, and juvenile delinquency cases.  By providing 
social services, follow-up for non-complying individuals, and 
improving interactions with decision-makers (in this instance, 
 
93.  See BORUCHOWITZ, ET. AL., supra note 2; SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 
6. 
94.  BORUCHOWITZ, ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. 
95.  See SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 6, at 7–9. 
96.  Id. 
97.  See id. 
98.  Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 
258 (2015); see also Carroll, supra note 90; Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with 
Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1044 (2013). 
99.  CYNTHIA LEE, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A COMMUNITY 
COURT GROWS IN BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (2013). 
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the judges) who treat defendants with respectful, neutrality, and 
offer opportunities to participate, the community court reduced 
crime, strengthened neighborhoods, and supported the position 
that procedural justice and community engagement are the 
cornerstones for success.100  On this latter point, respectful 
interactions between the judge and defendant improved 
defendants’ perceptions about the fairness of their treatment by 
the legal system.101  The Center for Court Innovation created an 
evaluation toolkit, which was “developed to help judges and 
other criminal court practitioners assess their individual 
practices, as well as the factors that may contribute to court 
users’ perceptions of fairness.”102 
In addition to observational study, scholars continue to 
explore official records of misdemeanor case processing.  One 
comprehensive study of misdemeanors examined more than 
100,000 police encounters in New York City, seeking to examine 
whether the process was still the punishment.103  By tracing 
these encounters from initial arrest through disposition, Geller 
found that, although misdemeanor offenders avoided severe 
sanctions, they were subjected to significant burdens before 
their cases were resolved.104  In fact, fewer than two-thirds of the 
misdemeanor arrests resulted in guilty pleas, and, of the guilty 
pleas, the majority were for less severe offenses not involving jail 
sentences.105  This same type of attrition was found between 
arraignment and conviction offense types, as well as the low rate 
of arrestees being found guilty of their arraignment charges.106  
In total, most of the arrests resulted in dismissals, an 
 
100.  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Princeton Univ. 
Press 2006) (arguing that procedural justice, i.e., perceptions of fairness, leads 
to compliance with the law). 
101.  Id. 
102.  EMILY GOLD LAGRATTA & ELISE JENSEN, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, 
MEASURING PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: AN EVALUATION TOOLKIT at intro. 
(2015), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/P_J_Evaluatio
n.pdf. 
103.  Amanda Geller, The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level 
Arrests in the Broken Windows Era, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1025 (2016). 
104.  Id. at 1025–26. 
105.  Id. at 1045. 
106.  Id. at 1044–45. 
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adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,107 or low-level guilty 
pleas.108  Geller referred to this narrowing effect as “charge 
decay.”109  Geller’s data found that those arrested these minor 
crimes “faced considerable procedural burdens in their 
encounters with the justice system.”110  She found the arrests 
physically intrusive, the delay between arrest and disposition 
burdensome, and the coercive nature of the proceedings 
compelled nearly all to resolve their cases short of trial.111 
Given that most misdemeanor defendants resolve their 
cases by waiving their constitutional right to trial in a  plea 
bargain, the recent psychological research on the validity of 
defendant plea decisions, particularly whether defendants 
actually understand their rights and the consequences of 
entering guilty pleas, is essential.112  To make a knowing and 
intelligent plea decision, defendants “must have enough 
knowledge to make an informed decision, and . . . must be able 
to understand and appreciate the information.”113  The Redlich 
and Summer study focused primarily on felony offenders (90%) 
and whether defendants actually understood their rights by 
“interview[ing] and assess[ing] defendants who recently pled 
guilty,” including if they voluntarily entered guilty pleas and if 
these factors varied by judge as well as pretrial or post-plea 
detention.114  They found an inconsistency between what the 
defendants believed and what they actually understood about 
the voluntariness of their pleas and the plea proceedings.115  
When challenged and asked specific questions about both, 
defendants demonstrated that they were not fully advised of 
their rights and a third of the sample believed that someone 
 
107.  In New York, defendants receive an adjournment in contemplation 
of dismissal (ACD), which means that the defendant is released and, after 
either six months or one year, if there is no other contact or arrest, the case is 
dismissed.  Id. at 1039–40 (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 170.55 (McKinney 
2007)).   
108.  Id. at 1046. 
109.  Geller, supra note 103, at 1043. 
110.  Id. at 1047. 
111.  Id. at 1052–53. 
112.  Redlich et al., supra note 7; Redlich & Summers, supra note 7. 
113.  Redlich et al., supra note 7 at 347 (citation omitted). 
114.  Redlich & Summers, supra note 7, at 5. 
115.  Id. at 10–16. 
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other than themselves made the final plea decision.116 
As expected, and consistent with prior research, Redlich and 
Summers noted that defendants reported less satisfaction with 
the courts when they felt pressured by the prosecutor or defense 
attorney to enter their pleas.117  Although an important first step 
in studying whether defendants make voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent decisions, Redlich and Summer identified several 
limitations of their seminal research study.118  First, they did not 
observe and systematically collect information about what 
actually transpired in court with the defendants, and they 
restricted study to only defendants who entered into plea 
bargains, excluding those who were offered, but rejected the 
offered pleas.119  Another weakness, not identified by Redlich 
and Summer, is that the research focused primarily on felony, 
not misdemeanor offenders. 
As noted by Redlich and Summers, due process, which 
includes the right to counsel and the voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent waivers of rights, should be linked to perceived 
fairness and satisfaction with the courts.120  Research “has 
shown that when defendants and litigants perceive the court 
process to be fair – exhibiting respect, voice, understanding, 
neutral decision-making, and helpfulness – they are more likely 
to comply with court orders and to follow the law in the future, 
regardless of whether they ‘win’ or ‘lose’ their case.”121  
Procedural justice has been tested in a number of court settings, 
including small claims, family, and criminal justice 
misdemeanor and felony courts.122  Greater due process and 
procedural justice should lend to improved satisfaction and 
positive perception of the courts as well as reduced recidivism. 
 
 
 
 
 
116.  Id. at 13. 
117.  Id. (citations omitted). 
118.  Id. at 15–16. 
119.  Id. 
120.  See generally id. 
121.  LAGRATTA & JENSEN, supra note 102, at intro. (footnote omitted). 
122.  Id. 
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III. Promoting Wider, Deeper, and Interdisciplinary Study of 
the Misdemeanor Courts 
 
Millions of people are prosecuted every year in American 
misdemeanor courts.123  Most individuals who interact with our 
legal system do so in the misdemeanor courts, yet relatively little 
is known about the processing of these cases, the financial and 
human toll of these proceedings, and the cost to the perceived 
legitimacy of the legal system.  The following section outlines the 
next steps in empirically studying misdemeanor courts, court 
proceedings, and the courtroom workgroup.  Although there has 
been an increase in recent empirical study of the misdemeanor 
courts, there is still much more to learn. 
By continuing the study of the courts using mixed-method 
approaches, we can advance our understanding of these unique 
court settings through identification of strengths and 
weaknesses and development of evidence-based 
recommendations and policies to make procedures more just.  As 
evidenced above, official and archival reports only tell part of the 
story, but more systemic and large-scale data collection and 
study is still necessary.124  Official data on misdemeanor arrests 
and prosecutions, pretrial detention, and sentencing outcomes is 
necessary to properly theorize how the criminal justice system 
is responding to and, perhaps, counterintuitively perpetuating 
recidivism.125  Evidence-based criminal justice policies are likely 
to ensure equity and equal treatment under the law.126 
In addition to examining official data, researchers should 
dive more deeply into courts.  For example, they can engage in 
extensive observational research to capture what actually is 
occurring in court or expand the study of the short- and long-
term consequences of misdemeanor arrests and adjudications—
including the potential net-widening effects of these 
interactions.  Furthermore, researchers can build upon prior 
findings by interviewing the courtroom workgroup and 
defendants, or those on the receiving end of the process and 
 
123. Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1315. 
124. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 31 (2011). 
125. See Natapoff, supra note 1. 
126. Hashimoto, supra note 124, at 33. 
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punishment, in an effort to ascertain their actual understanding 
of the process and their satisfaction with the courts. 
This research should include deep studies of single courts 
which explore using ethnographic techniques to understand the 
entrenched problems afflicting the misdemeanor court system.  
A recent award-winning book by Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve 
uncovered not just inequity in the felony court process, but 
systemic, racially-charged inequities hidden behind a post-
racial, color-blind narrative which masks the extent of organized 
racial injustice.127  Her characterization of “due process for [the] 
undeserving” as a “ceremonial charade” with a focus on 
efficiency and “organizational utility” may be particularly 
poignant in the processing of misdemeanor cases, which by their 
very nature may be considered less important and worthy of real 
justice.128  The practice, described by Van Cleve, includes: “(1) 
the streamlining of scripted due process requirements, (2) the 
curtailing of due process through informal sanctions that are 
often not part of the court record, and (3) the absolute exclusion 
of mopes129 from participation in the legal process—even in 
cursory ways mandated by law.”130  Replicating the work of Van 
Cleve in misdemeanor courts, researchers may peel back the 
layers of racialized justice that most likely plague the lower 
criminal courts as well.  Additional systemic and empirical study 
of the breadth and consequences of racialized justice, as well as 
the lack of counsel and due process that have been found 
recently identified in two research studies, should be 
investigated further.131 
 
A. Observational Study to Measure Due Process in the Courts 
 
As noted by Alfini (1981) and Ryan (1980), information from 
a handful of counties, jurisdictions, or courts does not 
sufficiently provide a full understanding of the complexities of 
 
127.  See NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND 
INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (Stanford Law Books 2016). 
128.  Id. at 73 (internal quotations omitted). 
129.  Id.  Mopes is a term used by court professionals to describe those 
perceived as lazy, incompetent, and unworthy.  Id. at 58. 
130.  Id. at 73. 
131.  SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 6; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 90. 
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these diverse courts.132  Ryan noted that the courts in Columbus, 
Ohio were significantly different and distinct from the New 
Haven, Connecticut courts observed by Malcolm Feeley.133  More 
contemporary work has likewise highlighted significant 
differences in the processing of misdemeanor cases.134  The Van 
Cleve findings likewise demonstrated distinctions in an urban 
court setting.135  The differences in case processing, the 
courtroom workgroups, and outcomes were wildly different in 
South Carolina and Florida.136  The most profound difference 
was that outside of Richland County, where the capital of South 
Carolina sits, ninety percent of cases in the State were processed 
without a single lawyer in the courtroom.137  In Florida, 
misdemeanor court judges must be attorneys,138 so there was at 
least one attorney in Florida’s courtrooms.  Whether lawyer and 
non-lawyer judges differ in important procedural and 
substantive justice respects remains an open, empirical, and 
constitutional question. 
Comprehensive observational data collection will provide 
insight into these courts and essentially work in near secrecy, 
without transparency, and with little oversight.  As noted by 
Erica Hashimoto, we need more and better data to understand 
the “extent to which misdemeanor defendants are represented 
(and by whom) and on misdemeanor sentencing.”139  Gathering 
information on the types of cases prosecuted in these courts, 
evaluating whether lawyer and non-lawyer judges differ in 
adjudicating and sentencing lower-criminal-court cases, and 
assessing the functioning of the courtroom workgroup in these 
courts are important to determining whether these courts are 
operating justly and fairly.  In particular, data should be 
collected on the demographic characteristics of the judges, 
 
132.  See MISDEMEANOR COURTS, supra note 46; Ryan, supra note 51. 
133.  Ryan, supra note 51, at 80. 
134.  See SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 6; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 
90. 
135.  See GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 127. 
136.  Id. 
137.  SMITH ET AL., supra note 90. 
138.  Matt Ford, When Your Judge Isn’t a Lawyer, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/when-your-judge-
isnt-a-lawyer/515568/. 
139.  Erica Hashimoto, supra note 98, at 1044. 
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prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants, as well as any 
other courtroom personnel.  Recording the length of the 
proceedings, advisement of rights, waivers of rights, entries of 
plea, requests for bench or jury trial, sentencing (when relevant), 
and advisement of the consequences of conviction will get to the 
heart of measuring the due process afforded misdemeanants. 
 
B. Courtroom Workgroup 
 
Since Malcolm Feeley’s study of the misdemeanor courts, 
the Center for Court Innovation has conducted a comprehensive 
study of the community court in Brooklyn, New York and Van 
Cleve has conducted an in-depth ethnographic study of felony 
courts in Cook County, Illinois.140  The Center found that the 
community court model reduced crimes and strengthened 
neighborhoods, supporting the proposition that procedural 
justice and community engagement are the cornerstones for 
success.141  Replication of this model is necessary to determine 
the generalizability of their findings and whether the 
community court model might eradicate the potential for the 
racialized justice found by Van Cleve. 
In addition to gathering data on perceptions, researchers 
should focus on the procedures employed by the courtroom 
workgroup to advise defendants of their right to counsel, 
warnings regarding the advisability of waiving that right, the 
adequacy of plea colloquies, and other relevant factors.  
Observers should gather information such as: the start time of 
the proceedings; whether judges or other courtroom personnel 
provided explanations; rules or an overview of the proceedings 
to the gallery or defendants; whether there was an introduction; 
whether eye-contact was made with defendants; whether plain 
language was used; and an evaluation, using a Likert scale, of 
how helpful the court staff was in addressing questions, 
including how strongly the observers agreed or disagreed on 
measures of judicial, prosecutor, and defense attorney demeanor 
during the court session on respectfulness, fairness, 
attentiveness, interestedness, consistency, knowledgeability, 
 
140.  See LEE ET AL., supra note 99. 
141.  See id. 
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clarity, and intimidation.  These observations should then be 
compared with the defendant’s understanding of their rights and 
perceptions about court proceedings. 
The prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges (“the 
courtroom workgroup”) should be interviewed on their 
perceptions of the misdemeanor courts and interactions with 
defendants.  Interviewing should occur after data collection to 
avoid the courtroom workgroup consciously or unconsciously 
changing their behaviors during the study period.  Specifically, 
questions about their understanding of the right to counsel and 
due process in misdemeanor courts, as well as procedural justice 
(i.e., whether they perceive that defendants are given the 
opportunity to be heard, they are respected, the decision-making 
process was neutral, and the courtroom workgroup was 
interested in their personal situations) should be explored.  The 
work by the Center for Court Innovation,142 Redlich et al.143 and 
Van Cleve144 should be replicated in a variety of jurisdictions to 
provide comparisons of courtroom workgroups and defendants’ 
perceptions of the court proceedings across divergent localities. 
 
C. Defendant Understanding of the Process and Satisfaction 
with the Courts 
 
The cornerstone of due process in American courts is that 
defendants who enter a plea understand the gravity of that 
decision.  To enter a plea, defendants must knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waive their fundamental and 
constitutional rights, including the right to counsel and trial.145  
However, there is a lack of research focusing on whether 
misdemeanor defendants, who are predominantly waiving their 
rights, actually understand the rights that they are forfeiting or 
the consequences of entering their pleas.  Redlich and her 
colleagues have begun to explore these questions and observed 
that “field studies with actual defendant decision makers [sic] 
are imperative.”146  Replicating their work and using their well-
 
142.  Id. 
143.  Redlich et al. supra. note 7. 
144.  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 127. 
145.  Redlich & Summers, supra note 7. 
146.  Redlich et al., supra note 7, at 350. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/8
ARTICLE 8_SMITH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2019  2:14 PM 
2018 MISDEMEANOR COURTS 477 
defined and standardized questions, researchers should 
examine whether defendants knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive their rights, enter pleas, and understand 
misdemeanor court proceedings.147  This can be done by 
identifying the factors that influence defendants’ decisions, the 
reasons defendants forgo counsel and enter pleas, and assessing 
their understanding of what transpired in court, including 
whether they understood their constitutional rights, voluntarily 
waived their rights to counsel and trial, comprehended the 
short- and long-term consequences of entering a plea and their 
perceived fairness of and satisfaction with the proceedings.148 
Using these instruments, researchers can collect 
quantitative and qualitative information about the accuracy of 
the defendants’ understanding of the court process, their 
constitutional rights, and the outcomes of the proceedings, 
including their decisions about counsel and trial, the 
voluntariness of their pleas, their comprehension of the plea and 
proceedings, their perceptions about the proceedings, the 
courtroom workgroup, and their satisfaction with the outcome 
and process.  These first-hand accounts by defendants will 
provide much-needed information in understanding the 
subjective knowledge about their rights, the court proceedings, 
and the consequences of their decisions, as well as a measure of 
whether, as required by the Supreme Court, defendants 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their 
constitutional rights in misdemeanor cases.  Essential data will 
result from the collection of data on the outcome of the 
proceedings, the influence of representation, and demographic, 
legal, and extralegal characteristics.  Additionally, defendants’ 
perceptions on procedural justice in comparison with proceeding 
outcomes, attendees’ in-court observations, and due process 
afforded to misdemeanor defendants will provide essential data 
on open questions. 
 
 
 
147.  Redlich & Summers, supra note 7; see also Allison D. Redlich, Miko 
M. Wilford, & Shawn Bushway, Understanding Guilty Pleas Through the Lens 
of Social Science, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 458 (2017). 
148.  LAGRATTA & JENSEN, supra note 102; see also Redlich & Summers, 
supra note 7; Redlich et al., supra note 7. 
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D. Linking Mass Incarceration to Misdemeanor Offending 
 
It is likely that there are long-term effects of misdemeanor 
arrest, incarceration, and conviction on health, economic well-
being, and behavior.149  Mass incarceration and over-
criminalization are significant concerns, yet scholars have 
ignored the study of misdemeanor prosecution as a possible 
gateway to mass incarceration.  Renewed focus on recidivism 
rates among misdemeanor defendants, variations on the 
influence of legal and extra-legal factors, or procedural justice 
and due process may shed light on a link between broken 
windows policing and an unprecedented number of 
misdemeanor arrests and court filings.150  Whether there are 
negative consequences associated with criminalizing so many 
individuals has yet to be explored; more research should 
examine the assumption that undergirds the broken windows 
theory.  This is especially true because the little research that 
has been conducted has found that “there appears to be no good 
evidence that broken windows policing reduces crime.”151 
The revolving jail door is a concept that has yet to be fully 
explored as to its particular effect on managing the poor through 
the cycle of misdemeanor arrests.152  Post-misdemeanor court 
processing data should be conducted using archival research to 
determine whether defendants failed to pay fines, otherwise 
violated the terms and conditions of their sentencings, or 
committed new law violations, particularly noting the outcomes 
of the violations.  This data allows for the evaluation of 
recidivism on technical and criminal offending with a particular 
focus on whether defendants were appointed counsel.  Moreover, 
and particularly poignant and in need of further study, is the 
probability that there are massive wrongful convictions in the 
lower courts.153  Without systematic study or mandated 
appellate review, these miscarriages of justice can fly under the 
radar. 
 
149.  Amanda Geller, supra note 103, at 1058. 
150.  BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 2. 
151.  Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 91, at 316. 
152.  See, e.g., JOHN IRWIN, THE JAIL: MANAGING THE UNDERCLASS IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (Univ. of Cal. Press 1985). 
153.  GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 127. 
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E. Race, Ethnicity, and Other Extra-Legal Factors and Long-
Term Consequences 
 
Unlike research in the felony courts, little research has 
focused on the influence of race and other extralegal factors in 
disparities in misdemeanor arrests, prosecution, dispositions, 
and sentencing.  The research that has been conducted 
demonstrates that there are clear inequities and more research 
exploring these relationships is necessary.154  Several micro-
level misdemeanor studies found that black and Hispanic 
individuals are more often arrested in communities adopting the 
broken-windows approach to policing.155  Kohler-Hausmann and 
Geller and Fagan found in their research that the highest rates 
of misdemeanor arrests and marijuana arrests occurred in 
neighborhoods that were predominantly black or Hispanic.156 
Furthermore, there is an even greater lack of scholarly 
attention on disparities in prosecution and disposition of 
misdemeanor offending in the criminal courts.  A notable 
exception, discussed above, was research conducted by Muñoz et 
al, who found evidence that racial, ethnic, and immigration 
stereotypes affected an increased risk of conviction.157  Another 
was Leiber and Blowers’ study which found that race influenced 
how prosecutors characterized defendants’ cases, characterizing 
black defendants’ cases as more serious.158  Consistent with 
felony research, Leiber and Blowers found “the effects of race on 
decision making [sic] were found to be overt and direct as well 
as subtle, indirect, and in interaction with other variables.”159  
The highly touted ethnographic work of Van Cleve in Chicago’s 
felony courts provides a roadmap for more study by observers 
armed with notepads to engage in systematic collection of 
information.160  Future research should examine the interactive 
 
154.  Id. 
155.  Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race 
and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 591, 22–24 (2010). 
156.  Id.; see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass 
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014). 
157.  Muñoz et al., supra note 85. 
158.  See Lieber & Blowers, supra note 73. 
159.  Id. at 481. 
160.  See GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 127. 
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effects of race, ethnicity, and legal factors to explore explicit and 
implicit racial, ethnic, and immigrant bias in the highly 
discretionary processing of misdemeanor offenses, including 
arrest, prosecution, disposition, and sentencing.161 
 
Conclusion 
 
An estimated thirteen million people are prosecuted in the 
misdemeanor courts each year.162  Three times as many 
misdemeanors than felonies.163  Preliminary research has 
uncovered constitutional violations and some potential long-
term negative consequences for this over-criminalization.  
However, relatively little is known about the processing of 
misdemeanor cases, the financial and human toll of these 
proceedings, and the cost of inequities on perceived legitimacy of 
the legal system.  By engaging in wider and deeper analyses in 
a variety of jurisdictions, research can begin to untangle the 
many complicated and open questions on due process and 
procedural justice in the misdemeanor courts, as well as the 
short- and long-term individual and societal effects of 
prosecuting millions of people each year. 
 
 
161.  Muñoz et al, supra note 85, at 128. 
162.  Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor 
Justice, 98 Boston U. L. Rev. 731, 737 (2018), Natapoff, supra note 1, at 1315. 
163.  Id. at 734.  
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